

Huggett (1996) Model

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Model Features

We compute a simplified version of [Huggett \(1996\)](#)

Households:

- Live for many (a_D) periods
- Earnings are random
- Age of retirement is fixed (a_R).

Government:

- Pays transfers to retired households (annuitized income in the data)

Simplifying assumptions:

- Partial equilibrium
- No random mortality
- No intergenerational links
- No labor-leisure choice.

Model Primitives

Demographics

Households live for exactly a_D periods.

Total mass of households is $N = 1$.

Preferences

$$\mathbb{E} \sum_{a=1}^{a_D} \beta^a u(c_a) \quad (1)$$

Endowments

Working agents are endowed with labor efficiency $\eta_a e_a$

η_a : age-efficiency profile

e_a : labor efficiency (wage) shock

- governed by a **Markov chain**: $\Pr(e' = \varepsilon_k | e = \varepsilon_j) = P_e(k, j)$.
- new agents draw labor endowments from a fixed distribution.
- number of states: $N_{e'}$.

Markets

Labor: wage w

Capital rental: r

Goods: numeraire.

Government

Taxes labor income: $T = \tau_w w L$.

Pays retirement transfers: $\varpi(a) = \varpi$ if $a > a_R$.

Household Problem

Exogenous state variables are age a and labor endowment e : $s = (a, e)$.

Endogenous state variable: wealth k .

Borrowing constraint: $k \geq 0$.

Sequence problem

$$\max E \sum_{a=1}^{a_D} \beta^a u(c_a)$$

subject to

$$k_{a+1} = y_a - c_a \geq 0$$

$$y_a = R k_a + w(1 - \tau_w) \eta_a e_a + \varpi(a) \quad (2)$$

Household Dynamic Program

$$V(k, s) = \max u(y(k, s) - k') + \beta \mathbb{E}V(k', s') \quad (3)$$

with

$$y(k, s) = Rk + w(1 - \tau_w) \eta_a e + \varpi(s) \quad (4)$$

subject to $k' \geq 0$.

Euler equation:

$$u'(c) \geq \beta R \mathbb{E}u'(c') \quad (5)$$

with equality if $k' > 0$.

Household Solution

Solution is a consumption function $c(k, a, e)$ which satisfies

$$u'(c[k, a, e]) \geq \beta R \sum_{e'} P_e(e, e') u'(c[y - c(k, a, e), a + 1, e'])$$

In the last period, consume all income:

$$c(k, a_D, e) = y(k, a_D, e) \quad (6)$$

Parameter Choices

We simply take parameters from Huggett's paper.

Exercise: implement the calibration.

Calibrated parameters: β, δ, A .

Calibration targets: $K/Y, w = 1, R$.

Preferences

$$u(c) = c^{1-\sigma}/(1-\sigma)$$

$$\sigma = 2.$$

Choose β to match $K/Y = 2.9/\lambda$.

Demographics

Households live from age 20 to 79.

Work from 20 to 64 (45 years).

Retire for 15 years.

Prices

- $w = 1$
- $R = 1.04$

Government

$$\tau_w = 0.4 \text{ (Trostel 1993).}$$

Set transfers to 40% of average earnings.

- This can be done before computing equilibrium.

Labor Endowments

Can be set before equilibrium is computed.

Empirical studies estimate **AR(1)** processes for [log earnings] minus [mean log earnings, η_a] by age.

New agents draw endowments from exogenous distribution:

$$\ln(e_1) \sim N(0, \sigma_1^2).$$

Over time, endowments are drawn from an **AR(1)**:

$$\ln(e_a) = \eta_a + \gamma \ln(e_{a-1}) + \varepsilon_a.$$

$$\ln(\varepsilon_a) \sim N(0, \sigma_\varepsilon^2).$$

We follow **Huggett (1996)**:

- $\sigma_1^2 = 0.38$, $\sigma_\varepsilon^2 = 0.045$, $\gamma = 0.96$.

- Approximate the AR(1) on a grid of 18 states equally spaced over $\pm 4\sigma_1$.
- Add an additional state at $+6\sigma_1$ to capture skewness of earnings distribution.
- Use [Tauchen \(1986\)](#) (we have code for that)

Age-efficiency profile

From PSID data ([Huggett, 1996](#))

References

- HUGGETT, M. (1996): "Wealth distribution in life-cycle economies," *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 38, 469–494.
- TAUCHEN, G. (1986): "Finite state markov-chain approximations to univariate and vector autoregressions," *Economics letters*, 20, 177–181.