

Heterogeneous Agent Models

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Bewley Models

For many applications, we need models with **heterogeneous agents**.

In **Bewley models**, agents are ex ante identical.

They are ex post heterogeneous because they are hit by idiosyncratic shocks.

Incomplete markets prevents sharing these risks.

In this section, we study a simple endowment economy.

The goal is to get the mechanics down in a simple setting.

Endowment Economy

An Endowment Economy

- ▶ Demographics:
 - ▶ There is a unit measure of households.
 - ▶ Each lives forever.
- ▶ Preferences:

$$E \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t) \quad (1)$$

- ▶ Technology:
 - ▶ Households receive random endowments $y_t \in Y$ (finite).
 - ▶ Transition matrix: $\pi(y'|y)$.
- ▶ Markets:
 - ▶ Goods (numeraire), one period bonds (interest rate r)

No aggregate uncertainty

- ▶ Assume a "law of large numbers."
- ▶ Let $\Pi(y)$ be the stationary distribution of y .
- ▶ Assume that the fraction of households with endowment y is $\Pi(y)$.
- ▶ The aggregate endowment \bar{y} is constant over time.
- ▶ With complete markets, households would not face any uncertainty.

Household problem

Flow budget constraint:

$$a' = y + (1 + r)a - c \quad (2)$$

Borrowing constraint:

$$a' \geq -b \quad (3)$$

Household problem

- ▶ Focus on a **stationary equilibrium**.
 - ▶ Meaning: Aggregates & prices are constant over time.
 - ▶ But individual households move around in the distribution.
- ▶ State vector: (a, y) .
- ▶ Given: r .
- ▶ Bellman equation:

$$v(a, y) = \max u(c) + \beta \sum_{y'} \pi(y'|y) v(a', y') \quad (4)$$

s.t. budget constraint and borrowing constraint.

Household problem

The borrowing constraint may bind. We need Kuhn-Tucker.

Bellman equation

$$v(a, y) = \max u(y + (1+r)a - a') \quad (5)$$

$$+ \beta \sum_{y'} \pi(y'|y) v(a', y') + \mu(a' + b) \quad (6)$$

First-order conditions:

$$u'(c) = \beta \sum \pi(y'|y) \frac{\partial v(a', y')}{\partial a'} + \mu \quad (7)$$

$$\partial v / \partial a = u'(c) (1+r) \quad (8)$$

$$\mu(a' + b) = 0 \quad (9)$$

Household problem

Euler equation

$$u'(c) \geq E\beta(1+r)u'(c') \quad (10)$$

with equality if $a' > -b$.

Solution:

- ▶ $v(a,y), c(a,y), a'(a,y)$ that satisfy the usual conditions.

How does the household behave?

Assume (for the moment) that $y \sim iid$

Then (obviously?), consumption and saving depend on "cash on hand"

$$x = y + (1 + r)a \quad (11)$$

Also (obviously?), a' is increasing in x

If x is sufficiently high:

- ▶ Choose $a' > -b$ and satisfy standard Euler equation.

If x is below a cutoff:

- ▶ Set $a' = -b$ and "violate" the Euler equation.

The borrowing constraint depresses current consumption.

- ▶ Precautionary saving

Recursive competitive equilibrium

Key feature of RCE

Everything in the economy is a function of the aggregate state S .

Agents also have individual states.

Agents form expectations using the **law of motion** for S : $S' = G(S)$

- ▶ E.g., to form expectations over future interest rate, use the law of motion for k and the price function $q = f'(k)$.

A fixed point problem:

- ▶ Agents' policy functions depends on the laws of motion.
- ▶ The laws of motion depend on agents' policy functions.

Stationary RCE

- ▶ Aggregate state:
 - ▶ The joint distribution of assets and endowments: $\Phi(a, y)$.
 - ▶ This is needed to compute aggregates.
- ▶ Objects:
 - ▶ Household: $v(a, y), c(a, y), a'(a, y)$.
 - ▶ $\Phi(a, y)$.
 - ▶ Price function: $r(\Phi)$.
- ▶ Equilibrium conditions:
 - ▶ Household: see above.
 - ▶ Market clearing.
 - ▶ Time invariance of Φ .

Market Clearing

Goods:

$$C = \int \int c(a, y) \Phi(da, dy) = \int y \Pi(dy) = \bar{y} \quad (12)$$

Bonds:

$$\int \int a'(a, y) \Phi(da, dy) = 0 \quad (13)$$

Time invariance of the distribution

Informally, household choices determine tomorrow's distribution Φ' .

The policy function $a'(a, y)$ implies a law of motion for Φ .

In stationary equilibrium, the law of motion must imply $\Phi' = \Phi$.

Law of motion for the distribution

Define a **transition function** $Q((a, y), (A, Y))$.

Its value is the probability that

- ▶ a household in state (a, y) today
- ▶ ends up in $(a', y') \in (A, Y)$ tomorrow.

$$Q((a, y), (A, Y)) = \begin{cases} \sum_{y' \in Y} \pi(y'|y) & \text{if } a'(a, y) \in A \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

In words:

- ▶ Need to draw $y' \in Y$ and
- ▶ Need to choose saving in A

Law of motion for the distribution

Law of motion

$$\Phi'(A, Y) = \int \int Q((a, y), (A, Y)) \Phi(da, dy) \quad (14)$$

In words:

- ▶ $\Phi'(A, Y)$: What is the mass of households in the set of states (A, Y) tomorrow?
- ▶ For any (a, y) , this is given by $Q((a, y), (A, Y))$.
- ▶ Sum over all (a, y) to get the total mass.

Stationarity then means: $\Phi'(A, Y) = \Phi(A, Y)$ for all (A, Y) .

Quantitative Implications

A similar model was calibrated by [Aiyagari \(1994\)](#).

Main insights:

1. A simple bond yields a lot of **self-insurance**.
Households build up enough wealth to stay away from the borrowing constraint most of the time.
Consumption is quite smooth.
2. Most households have the same, low **MPC**
This follows from self-insurance.
3. Wealth is more concentrated than earnings.
But not nearly as concentrated as in the data.

But it's important that households live forever...

Non-stationary RCE

- ▶ Now Φ evolves over time.
- ▶ Household:
 - ▶ Add the aggregate state Φ to the household's state: $v(a, y, \Phi)$ and $a'(a, y, \Phi)$.
 - ▶ The household takes prices as functions of the aggregate state: $r(\Phi)$.
 - ▶ The household knows the law of motion for Φ : $\Phi' = H(\Phi)$.
- ▶ Equilibrium:
 - ▶ Drop stationarity of Φ .
 - ▶ Replace with a **consistency condition**.

Household Problem

$$v(a, y, \Phi) = \max u(y + (1 + r(\Phi))a - a') \quad (15)$$

$$+ \beta \sum_{y'} \pi(y'|y) v(a', y', H(\Phi)) + \mu(a' + b) \quad (16)$$

Consistency Condition

The idea:

- ▶ Household decisions imply a distribution Φ'
- ▶ The decisions are based on the expectation $\Phi' = H(\Phi)$
- ▶ Both need to be consistent with each other.

$$\Phi'(A, Y) = \int \int Q((a, y), (A, Y)) \Phi(da, dy) = H(\Phi)(A, Y) \quad (17)$$

Reading

- ▶ Acemoglu (2009), ch. 17.4.
- ▶ Macroeconomics, ch. 11.4
- ▶ Krueger, "Macroeconomic Theory," ch. 10.

References I

Acemoglu, D. (2009): *Introduction to modern economic growth*, MIT Press.

Aiyagari, S. R. (1994): "Uninsured idiosyncratic risk and aggregate saving," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 109, 659–684.