Central Bank Independence

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Introduction

Central banks in most developed countries have some independence.

Goals are prescribed:

price stability and full employment

Implementation is up to the Fed

Fed governors are senate confirmed
but then serve 14-year terms (or not any more ...)


Tools are limited

- buy and sell (mostly) bonds
- set a few interest rates

Why this arrangement?

I Independence as a Commitment Device

1.1 Lessons from the Philips Curve



Expansionary monetary policy

=>

Move along the PC

Does the PC shift?

Lessons from the Philips Curve

The Fed benefits from anchoring inflation expectations.


Anchored:

- Rising inflation does not move expectations much.
- Fed can tolerate high inflation for a while.

Not anchored:

- Rising inflation moves expectations.
- After a shock, bringing down inflation expectations is costly.

1.1 Lessons from the Philips Curve



Anchored inflation expectations



Rising inflation does not move expectations much.

1.2 How to anchor expectations?

The problem: The Fed cannot commit.

An easy way of anchoring: write inflation into law

• But that's too rigid

How can the Fed convince the public that it will keep its promises?

Without commitment: Need to build a reputation.

That requires giving up short-term gains for long-term gains.

That requires a policy maker with a long time horizon.

1.3 What if the Fed is not independent?

Politicians with short horizons take over.

Temptation to run the economy "hot" before the next election.

Pay the inflation cost later.

Political business cycles

• This is how the 1970s inflation got started.

Over time, inflation expectations become unanchored.

Monetary policy loses its power.

• When the Fed needs to move along the Philips curve, it starts to shift right away.

1.4 Fiscal Commitment

The temptation:

- Run deficits before the next election.
- Let the Fed finance the deficits by buying bonds.
- Pay the debt cost later.


Most high-inflation episodes stem from fiscal deficits financed by printing money.

An independent Fed commits the government to be (more) fiscally responsible.

1.5 Fed Independence and Inflation

IMPACT OF CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE ON INFLATION





Fed independence

 \Longrightarrow

Lower inflation

Source: Econofact

1.6 Downsides of Fed Independence

Lack of accountability

Congress cannot correct Fed mistakes

The Fed may focus too much focus on price stability and neglect employment.

A common complaint about the ECB

The Fed can finance government debt, if it wants to

• QE effectively has done this.

1.7 Summary

Monetary policy is effective when inflation expectations are anchored.

Anchoring is achieved by building a reputation.

That requires a policy maker with a long time horizon.

• an independent Fed

But there can be too much indepdenence.

And not all Fed actions benefit from independence.

• e.g., bank supervision

1.8 Reading

John Cochrane: Central Bank Independence, June 2025

• A nuanced discussion of the pros and cons of Fed independence.